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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present a detailed review of the 
works on public key cryptography (PKC) in wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs). In the early days of sensor 
networks, public key cryptography was thought to be 
completely unfeasible considering its computational 
complexity and energy requirements. By this time, 
several works have proved that the lightweight 
versions of many well-known public key algorithms 
can be utilized in WSN environment. With the expense 
of a little energy, public key based schemes could in 
fact be the best choice for ensuring data security in 
high-security demanding WSN applications. Here, we 
talk about the notion of public key cryptography in 
WSN, its applicability, challenges in its 
implementation, and present a detailed study of the 
significant works on PKC in WSN. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Security in wireless sensor network (WSN) has a 
great number of challenges, ranging from the nature of 
wireless communications, constrained resources of the 
sensors, unknown topologies of the deployed 
networks, unattended environment where sensors 
might be susceptible to physical attacks, dense and 
large networks, etc. Each of these issues in fact leads 
to different research direction. Nonetheless, 
considering all the different topics of research in WSN 
security, Public Key Cryptography (PKC) most 
probably is the hottest topic in recent times. 
This is generally perceived that PKC is complex, 
slow, resource hungry, and as thus not at all suitable 
for use in ultra-low power network environments like 
wireless sensor networks. It is therefore a common 
practice to emulate the asymmetry of traditional PKC 
services by using a set of protocols based on 
symmetric key cryptography (SKC). The main reason 
for using SKC is that it is comparatively less resource-
hungry than PKC. However, with respect to key 
management, SKC could be inflexible and more 
difficult than PKC. This is because often the keys for 
the sensors need to be generated in huge numbers and 
in many cases they need to be stored in the memories 
of the sensors prior to their deployment. Such type of 
pre-distribution of keys could really be cumbersome 
when a large sensor network is to be deployed. 
In contrast to the commonly held belief of the 
inefficiency and inapplicability of PKC in WSN, some 
researchers have come forward and proved that the 
lightweight versions of many well-known PKC 
schemes can be applied for tiny low powered sensors.  
For implementing PKC-based schemes in WSN, 
there are mainly two approaches: 
a) Design and development of customized 
hardware so that they could be used in the 
sensor boards for supporting public key based 
operations and computations. 
b) Writing customized software or program that 
could support PKC operation or using 
lightweight versions of the PK based schemes. 
A combination of hardware support and software 
optimization also works effectively for such 
implementations. So far, both from hardware and 
software perspectives, some works have already been 
done [1]. This paper presents a detailed survey on the 
applicable PKC-based schemes in WSN. The main 
objective of this work is to get a broad picture of the 
current research trend in applying high-standard 
cryptographic schemes in wireless sensor networks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 briefly mentions the pros and cons of 
implementing PKC in WSN, Section 3 presents the 
detailed survey, Section 4 discusses the future 
expectations, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. PKC in WSN: Pros and Cons  
  
The sensors that build up the network are usually of 
inadequate memory, processing, and communication 
capabilities and their energy sources are also very 
limited. As an example, Crossbow MICA2 mote [2] is 
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a well-known sensor node with an ATmega128L 8-bit 
processor at 8 MHz, 128KB program memory (flash), 
512KB additional data flash memory, 433, 868/916, or 
310 MHz multi-channel radio transceiver, 38.4 kpbs 
radio, 500-1000 feet outdoor range (depending on 
versions) with a size of only 58 x 32 x 7 (mm). Usually 
it is run by TinyOS operating system and powered by 2 
AA sized batteries. A device with this configuration 
cannot support security mechanisms that require 
executing a large amount of instructions. In addition, a 
sensor network usually contains a large number of 
sensors. The number of sensors in the network might 
directly affect the use of memory space of nodes, 
because often they store pre-distributed secret keys, 
keying information, or the codes to calculate pairwise 
secret keys between nodes in the network. Node failure 
is another problem that could also affect the network 
severely. If a node is busy relatively longer than other 
nodes (e.g., performing huge calculations related to 
security), it might lose its energy rapidly and can fail 
much sooner than other less active nodes. 
Most of the sensor network applications need at 
least a certain level of security for the communications 
among the sensor nodes and the base station (BS). The 
minimum requirements for any type of secure 
communication are: data privacy, integrity, and 
authenticity. All of these could be provided by using 
efficient cryptographic mechanisms. SKC is usually 
viable on sensor nodes but the size and scalability 
issue sometimes makes its use inefficient. Again, 
because of the unattended feature of WSNs, often 
these networks are vulnerable to physical capture 
attack. If the nodes carry sensitive key information 
within themselves, the attackers could get that after 
physically capturing the sensors (if any other 
preventive mechanisms are not used). Considering this 
particular issue, it is much more efficient to use PKC 
as in this case the nodes only carry public key 
materials of the BS instead of private secret keys. 
 
3. Review of PKC-Based Schemes in WSN 
 
Most of the works related to PKC in WSN are 
conducted to fit the low-power characteristic of the 
sensor nodes. Both from software and hardware 
perspectives, PKC-based schemes have shown 
reasonable performances. In this section, we present a 
detailed study on these exclusive research works.  
 
3.1. ECC and RSA on 8-bit CPUs 
 
Gura et al., in their work [3], present a comparative 
analysis of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and 
RSA on 8-bit CPUs. The authors note that they 
implemented ECC point multiplication and modular 
exponentiation on two exemplary 8-bit platforms in 
assembly code. As the first processor, they chose a 
Chipcon CC1010 8-bit microcontroller which 
implements the Intel 8051 instruction set. The CC1010 
contains 32KB of FLASH program memory, 2KB of 
external data memory, and 128 bytes of internal data 
memory. As the second processor, they took an Atmel 
ATmega128 processor which is frequently used for 
sensor network research (for example in Crossbow 
motes). The ATmega128 is an 8-bit microcontroller 
based on the AVR architecture and contains 128KB of 
FLASH program memory and 4KB of data memory. 
For ECC, they implemented point multiplication for 
three SECG-standardized elliptic curves with some 
optimizations. For RSA, they implemented RSA-1024 
on both of the chosen processors and RSA-2048 on the 
ATmega128 with some optimizations. Their 
experimental findings show that on both platforms, 
ECC-160 point multiplication outperforms the RSA-
1024 private-key operation by an order of magnitude 
and is within a factor of 2 of the RSA-1024 public-key 
operation. In summary, Gura et al.'s work for the first 
time gave the practical idea about the applicability of 
PKC algorithms in small resource-constrained devices. 
 
3.2. PKI for Key Distribution  
 
[4] presents the first known implementation of 
elliptic curve cryptography over F2p for sensor 
networks based on 8-bit, 7.3828 MHz MICA2 mote 
[2]. In this work the authors first demonstrate that the 
secret-key cryptography is tractable on MICA2 by 
instrumentation of TinyOS. Then with their method of 
implementation of multiplication of points on elliptic 
curves, they argue that PKI (public key infrastructure) 
for distribution of secret keys is also tractable. The 
results show that public key based scheme is viable for 
the modern-era sensors. Breaking the myth of the 
inapplicability of public key cryptography in sensor 
networks, this work shows that public keys can be 
generated within 34 seconds, and that shared secrets 
can be distributed among nodes in a sensor network 
within the same, using just over 1 kilobyte of SRAM 
and 34 kilobytes of ROM, which could easily be 
provided by the state-of-the-art sensor nodes. 
 
3.3. Rabin’s Scheme and NtruEncrypt 
 
In [5], the authors propose a custom hardware 
assisted approach which makes PKC feasible in WSN. 
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In order to validate their claim, they present proof of 
concept implementations of two different algorithms; 
Rabin’s Scheme and NtruEncrypt. 
Rabin’s Scheme was proposed in 1979 in [6]. It is 
based on the factorization problem of large numbers 
and is therefore similar to the security of RSA with the 
same sized modulus. The size of the modulus 
determines the security of the cipher. The disadvantage 
of RSA is that the algorithm necessary to implement 
both encryption and decryption is computation 
intensive. Rabin's scheme has asymmetric 
computational costs. It is only necessary to perform a 
simple modular squaring operation to encrypt a 
message. Therefore encryption can be preformed 
relatively efficiently, while the computational cost of 
the decryption algorithm is comparable to RSA. This 
asymmetrical property of Rabin's scheme is of 
significant practical importance in applications such as 
wireless sensor networks where encryption must be 
done on very low powered devices. On the other hand, 
NtruEncrypt [7] claims to be highly efficient and 
particularly suitable for embedded applications such as 
smart cards or RFID tags, while providing a level of 
security comparable to that of other established 
schemes, in particular RSA. 
Taking these asymmetric encryption techniques, the 
authors analyze the viabilities based on chip area, 
security level, delay, average power, energy per bit, 
and throughput. Overall, this work shows that it is 
possible to design PK encryption architectures with 
power consumption of less than 20 μW using the right 
selection of algorithms and associated parameters, 
optimization, and low-power techniques. This work 
also notes that it might be possible to achieve even 
better performance for self-powered sensors as this 
work was based on a regular ASIC (Application-
Specific Integrated Circuit) standard cell library that 
was not specifically optimized for low-power. 
 
3.4. TinyPK  
 
TinyPK system demonstrated in [8] shows that a 
PK-based protocol is feasible even for an extremely 
lightweight sensor network. TinyPK is a software-
based implementation of public key system tested on 
UC Berkeley MICA2 motes [2]. Incorporating the use 
of TinySec [9] or any other symmetric encryption 
service for sensor networks, TinyPK provides the 
functionality needed for a sensor and a third-party to 
mutually authenticate each other and to communicate 
securely. The mote authentication technique, proposed 
in this paper can be used either to collect evidence that 
a mote field is valid or to validate a specific mote and 
to link future traffic to that mote. The notion of a mote 
credential makes the task of a spoofing a mote network 
much more difficult than in an environment without 
credentials. In a TinyPK protected environment, a 
single stolen and reverse engineered mote cannot be 
used to impersonate other motes with different 
credentials. This level of protection is achieved with 
very little overhead and has been shown to operate on 
the most limiting of sensor network platforms. 
 
3.5. Authenticating Public Keys 
 
[10] investigates how to replace the public key 
authentication with symmetric key operations that are 
much more efficient. The authors show that due to a 
unique property of sensor networks, public keys do not 
need to be authenticated in the same way as it is done 
in the Internet environment (i.e., using certificates); 
instead, public keys can be authenticated using one-
way hash functions, which are much more efficient 
than signature verification on certificates. Their 
scheme uses all sensors’ public keys to construct a 
forest of Merkle trees of different heights. By 
optimally selecting the height of each tree, they can 
minimize the computation and communication costs. 
They also develop a trimming scheme based on sensor 
deployment knowledge. The results show that their 
scheme can save up to 86% of the energy for the 
public key authentication operation in WSN. 
 
3.6. Energy Analysis of PK Algorithms 
 
In [11], the authors present an analysis of energy 
consumptions of PKC schemes in wireless sensor 
networks. They also consider the impact of pubic key 
cryptography on battery life and compare PKC to other 
factors influencing energy consumption, such as idle 
listening, data reception and transmission, symmetric 
cryptography, etc. They quantify the energy costs in an 
8-bit microcontroller platform with RSA and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) (energy costs of digital 
signature and key exchange computations for RSA-
1024, ECDSA-160, RSA-2048, and ECDSA-224). 
This work shows that: with a given amount of energy, 
the authors were able to perform 4.2 times the number 
of key exchange operations (including mutual 
authentication) with ECC-160 compared to RSA-1024. 
Overall, this work presents a detailed picture of energy 
requirements for PKC operations in resource 
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constrained sensors which could be used as a good 
reference paper for other similar works. 
 
3.7. Ultra-Low Power PKC for WSNs 
 
[12] shows that special purpose ultra-low power 
hardware  implementations of public key algorithms 
can be used on sensor nodes. The authors in this work 
selected three low-complexity PKC schemes (Rabin’s 
scheme, NtruEncrypt, and Elliptic Curve) and for each 
of the schemes they developed three basic encryption 
architectures in TSMC 0.13μ CMOS standard cell 
technology. For comparing the inherently different 
algorithms and their feasibility for ultra-low power 
implementations, they chose algorithm specific 
parameter sets to provide approximately the same level 
of security. For Rabin’ scheme, a modulus of 512 bits 
was selected, which generally provides a security level 
of around 60 bits. In ECC architecture, for arithmetic 
operations, a prime field of 100 bits in size was chosen 
which could provide a security level between 56 to 60 
bits depending on the confidence level one puts into 
the assumption that no significant cryptanalytic 
progress has been made. Finally, for NtruEncrypt, 
system parameters ( , , ) (167,3,128)N p q =  were 
chosen to get a security level of around 57 bits. After 
analyzing the architectures in conjunction with the full 
algorithm descriptions, they estimated the overall 
power and bandwidth requirements of encryption and 
signature primitives.  
Overall, in this work, the authors show that PKC 
tremendously simplifies the implementation of many 
typical security services and additionally reduces 
transmission power due to less protocol overhead. 
 
3.8. Implementations of ECC-based PKCs 
 
Blaß and Zitterbart [13], in their work present 
efficient and lightweight implementations of PKC 
algorithms relying on elliptic curves. They checked 
their codes by running on popular 8-Bit ATMEGA128 
microcontroller which is used for MICA2 platform. 
For the lightweight implementation of ECC, one of 
the most important factors is the key size. In case of 
ECC, key size means the size of underlying finite field 
that is; if 53 bit keys are to be used, the elliptic curve 
must be over 532F . If the key size is smaller, it 
provides less security but faster computation. After a 
detailed primary analysis, the authors chose 113 bit 
key that means a curve over 1132F . The argument for 
choosing this curve was that it could offer about 16 
times more security than 109 bit keys which could be 
considered as enough security for today’s hardware. 
For making the entire implementation easier and 
lightweight, they also considered some other 
optimizations for memory savings, point 
multiplications, handcrafting a source to the target 
platform, sophisticated loop-unrolling, etc. 
This work presents the results of the 
implementations of various ECC-based algorithms; 
ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman), El-Gamal 
(which relies on traditional discrete logarithm problem 
and that has been adopted to elliptic curves and 
ECDLP), and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm).  
 
3.9. Sizzle 
 
In [14], the authors show that ECC not only makes 
public-key cryptography feasible on “mote”-like, 
embedded devices, but also it allows one to create a 
complete secure web server stack that runs efficiently 
within very tight resource constraints. They present 
their HTTPS stack, named Sizzle which has been 
implemented on multiple generations of the 
Berkeley/Crossbow motes where it runs in less than 
4KB of RAM, completes a full SSL handshake in 1 
second (session reuse takes 0.5 seconds), and transfers 
1 KB of application data over SSL in 0.4 seconds. 
Sizzle brings the Internet’s dominant security 
protocol (SSL) to devices with significant 
computational, memory and energy constraints. It uses 
highly optimized implementations of PKC to offer 
scalable key management and end-to-end security 
without sacrificing efficiency. Sizzle running on the 
Berkeley/Crossbow Mica2dot mote represents the 
world’s smallest secure web server in terms of both 
physical dimensions and resource utilizations.  
 
3.10. C4W: Identity-Based Public Key 
Infrastructure for WSN 
 
C4W presented in [15] is basically an identity-based 
public key infrastructure specially designed for WSNs. 
Usually any Identity-Based Cryptosystem (IBC) 
requires heavy computations. However, to reduce the 
processing burdens, the IBC algorithm of C4W is 
made lightweight based on ECC optimization 
techniques in [3] and Combined Public Key (CPK) 
cryptosystem presented in [16]. The authors in this 
work show that their identity-based scheme consumes 
Technical Report 2008N2-SP-NL 
 
less energy as it is certificateless and thus it is efficient 
in terms of computation and communication costs. 
 
3.11. Cooperative Public Key Authentication 
Protocol in Wireless Sensor Network 
 
A distributed and cooperative PK authentication is 
proposed in [17]. This work is mainly a theoretical 
work without practical implementation. To facilitate 
the proposed protocol, some modifications in the MAC 
frame are needed. In this cooperative mechanism, each 
node stores a limited number of hashed keys for other 
nodes which help in the authentication procedure 
during public key operation. According to [17], this 
scheme is free from any cryptographic operations, 
which is designed to make it fit for the constrained 
resources of the sensors. However the major drawback 
of the proposed method is that it is designed only for 
one hop authentication, which makes it impractical and 
inefficient for use in usual multi-hop WSNs. However, 
this scheme could be used for individual clusters with 
cluster heads, if clustering is used in the network. 
Hence, there remains enough scope of further 
investigation and enhancement of the protocol to make 
it practical for traditional WSNs. 
  
3.12. Implementation of Rabin’s Scheme Based 
Scheme on Tyndall National Institute Mote 
 
Murphy et al. [18] show that it is possible to 
implement PK algorithms on resource constrained 
sensor node platforms. Using a hardware/software co-
design approach, they successfully map a public key 
cryptosystem based on Rabin's scheme onto the motes 
developed by Tyndall National Institute. The 
implementation was prototyped on 25mm cube 
modules provided by the Institute [19]. These cubes 
consist of several different programmable modules that 
are interchangeable. The cubes were configured so that 
each node included a low power 8-bit Atmel 
microcontroller, a Spartan-IIE FPGA, and a RF 
transceiver. For their implementation, the different 
modules were synchronized by a shared 4 MHz clock. 
Their implementation mainly focused on efficient 
architectures that execute the public key algorithms 
using minimal resources. Their finding is that the 
hardware implementation of the encryption algorithm 
is much faster than the software implementation. 
Software implementations of the algorithm are also 
realizable and have the benefit of low cost and high 
flexibility. However the time necessary to perform 
encryption and decryption is significantly increased by 
using a software-only approach. 
 
3.13. Influence of PKC on Sensor Lifetime 
 
Piotrowski et al. [20] investigate four types of 
nodes; MICA2DOT, MICA2, MICAz, and TelosB and 
estimate the power consumptions for RSA and ECC 
operations. Their work presents detailed results of 
implementations of RSA-1024, ECC-160, RSA-2048, 
and ECC-224 on the mentioned platforms. 
Based on the results, the authors conclude that: 
transmission power is not an important factor when 
comparing cryptographic algorithms. Even sending a 
2048 bit RSA signature by a transceiver that requires 
1.0 μWs/bit, needs not more than 2 mWs for one 
signature. This is at least one order of magnitude less 
than the energy consumption required for computation 
of the cryptographic operations. However, for large 
multi–hop networks, it might become a factor. In that 
case a large signature increases the overall 
transmission power consumption in the network.  
 
3.14 Implementing Minimized Multivariate 
PKC on Low-Resource Embedded Systems 
 
In [21], the authors implement minimized 
multivariate PKC on Low-Resource Embedded 
Systems. They illustrate most of their minimization 
techniques on a current variant in the family of 
multivariate PKC called the Enhanced TTS (enTTS). 
TTS [22] is a consequence of the public-key 
cryptosystem TTM (Tame Transformation Method) 
and shares many of its superior properties, resulting in 
low signature delays, fast verification, and high 
complexity. To evaluate the performance of enTTS on 
modern sensor nodes, they benchmark enTTS on the 
Tmote Sky mote. Tmote Sky is equipped with an 8 
MHz Texas Instrument MSP430 microcontroller and a 
Chipcon CC2420 2.4 GHz radio that supports IEEE 
802.15.4 wireless low-power medium access control 
standard. A typical sensor node like the Tmote Sky 
mote has a small working RAM (10 KBytes in this 
case), a slightly larger read-only program memory (48 
KBytes), and a relatively large flash memory (1 
MBytes) for storing collected raw data and other 
auxiliary information for its operations. The results 
from this work show that multivariate schemes could 
be better contenders against the established PKC 
schemes if they are a lot better customized and 
optimized for use in wireless sensor networks. 
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3.15. Low-cost ECC for WSNs 
 
In [23], the authors present a low-cost PKC-based 
solution for security services such as key-distribution 
and authentication for WSNs. They propose a custom 
hardware assisted approach to implement ECC with 
the goal of obtaining stronger cryptography and 
minimizing the power consumption. 
 They also present the details of their designed 
Elliptic Curve Processor (ECP). Their ECP has the 
operational blocks: a Control Unit (CU), an Arithmetic 
Unit (AU), and Memory (RAM and ROM). In ROM, 
the ECC parameters and some constants could be 
stored. The RAM contains all input and output 
variables and it communicates with both the ROM and 
the ALU. The CU controls the scalar multiplication 
and the point operations. In addition, the controller 
commands the ALU which performs field 
multiplication, addition, and squaring. 
With this hardware assisted approach, the authors 
present their analysis of ECC algorithm and some 
positive results to allow the use of PKC in WSNs. 
 
3.16. Power Aware Design of an Elliptic Curve 
Coprocessor for 8-bit Platforms 
 
A work on hardware implementation of PKC for 
elliptic curve over binary extension fields is proposed 
in [24]. The goal of this work is to evaluate the energy 
costs of different ECC implementations for low-end 
systems, and to propose a new hardware coprocessor 
architecture. In their implementation of the dedicated 
coprocessor, the operands had a size of 163 bits, while 
the existing data path was of 8 bits only. They 
designed two different hardware devices in VHDL, 
and synthesized them using the 0.18 μm CMOS 
technology library by ST Microelectronics. Using the 
Synopsys tools Design Compiler and PrimePower, 
they obtained the area occupancy, the critical path, and 
the power consumption for each implementation. 
By using their coprocessor, they show that achieving 
the goals of low energy consumption, reduced silicon 
area requirements, and significant speed-up (compared 
to software solutions) are possible. This could be a 
feasible hardware assisted solution to get improved 
performance of ECC implementations in WSNs 
without degrading other performance parameters. 
 
3.17. Self-Certified Public Key Generation on 
the Intel Mote 2 Sensor Network Platform 
 
[25] presents an efficient ECC-based method for 
self-certified key generation in resource-constrained 
sensor nodes. In particular, the authors provide 
implementation results on the Intel Mote 2 sensor 
network platform [26] which demonstrate that such 
key generation can be established in the order of 60 
msec while consuming less than 30 mJ. 
The methodologies developed by the authors were 
implemented on Intel Mote 2 platform [26] which has 
an Intel PXA271 XScale processor running at a clock 
frequency ranging from 13 MHz to 416 MHz. The 
core frequency could be dynamically set in software, 
allowing the designer to carefully adjust the 
timing/power trade-off to optimize performance of a 
specific application. 
For implementation of the algorithms, some of the 
functions used in TinyECC [27] were taken. This 
package targeted the MICAz platform and provided a 
basic library of ECC-based functions, including scalar 
multiplication and exponentiation operations. Also 
some customizations for the XScale processor 
(including 32-bit operation optimizations) were carried 
out. In addition, supplementary functions, e.g., 
Montgomery arithmetic, were added. All codes were 
written in NesC running on TinyOS operating system. 
 
3.18. PKC-Based Security Architecture 
 
[28] proposes an efficient PKC based security 
architecture for WSNs with relatively less resource 
requirements. The proposed security architecture 
comprises basically of two parts; a key handshaking 
scheme based on simple linear operations and the 
derivation of decryption key by a receiver node. The 
architecture allows both base-station-to-node or node-
to-base-station secure communications, and node-to-
node secure communications. Analysis and simulation 
results show that the proposed architecture ensures a 
good level of security for communications in the 
network and could effectively be implemented using 
the limited computation, memory, and energy budgets 
of the current generation sensor nodes. 
 
3.19. Implementation of Elliptic Curve 
ElGamal (EC-ElGamal) Cryptosystem  
 
In [29], Ugus et al. implement elliptic curve and 
finite field arithmetic operations on MICAz mote. The 
experimental results presented in this work show that 
scalar point multiplication with a random base takes 
1.03s, while it takes only 0.57s in the case of fixed 
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point multiplication, when 2 pre-computed points are 
employed. Moreover, they claim to achieve at least 
44% faster operation than the best previous result for 
fixed point multiplication. The implementation of the 
elliptic curve EC-ElGamal encryption shows that the 
encryption operation only takes 1.19s, when in total 4 
pre-computed points are utilized. 
 
3.20. Energy Cost of Cryptographic Key 
Establishment 
 
In [30], the authors implement two protocols. The 
first protocol employs a lightweight variant of the 
Kerberos key transport mechanism with 128-bit AES 
encryption. The second protocol is based on ECMQV, 
an authenticated version of the elliptic curve Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, and uses a 256-bit prime field 
GF(p) as underlying algebraic structure. They evaluate 
the energy costs of both protocols on a Rockwell 
WINS node equipped with a 133 MHz StrongARM 
processor and a 100 kbit/s radio module. The 
evaluation considers both the processor’s energy 
consumption for calculating cryptographic primitives 
and the energy cost of radio communication for 
different transmit power levels. 
Their experiments show that the communication 
energy cost of Kerberos is between 39.5 mJ and 47.5 
mJ (which basically depends on the transmit power 
level). In their architecture, three of the four Kerberos 
messages are encrypted. When using 128-bit AES, the 
overall energy required for encryption and decryption 
of the messages is less than 0.1 mJ. As a whole, the 
Kerberos protocol is characterized by high 
communication energy cost, while the energy needed 
for encryption or decryption is almost negligible. 
They implement the ECDH/ECMQV key exchange 
using a 256-bit prime field as underlying algebraic 
structure in order to match the security level of 
Kerberos key transport with 128-bit AES encryption. 
According to their findings, a point multiplication over 
a 256-bit prime field takes approximately 4.25·106 
clock cycles on a StrongARM processor when 
implemented as their architecture. The results show 
that the overall energy cost of Kerberos key 
establishment is between 39.6 mJ and 47.6 mJ, while 
ECMQV key exchange requires an energy of between 
79.0 mJ and 84.6 mJ. In other words, the energy 
consumption of ECMQV and Kerberos differs merely 
by a factor of between 1.78 (for high transmit power) 
and 1.99 (for low transmit power).  
 
4. Other Works and Future Expectations 
 
Other than the mentioned works, [31] looks at 
several additive homomorphic public key encryption 
schemes and their applicability to WSNs. The authors 
in this work provide recommendations for selecting the 
most suitable PK schemes based on the topologies and 
the scenarios of WSNs. Also, in a recent work, Roman 
and Alcaraz [32] talk about the applicability of public 
key infrastructures in wireless sensor networks. 
Although PKC in WSN is one of the relatively new 
areas, a lot of researchers have tried to deal with this 
issue within a short period of time. Considering all the 
works done so far, it can be realized that the abundant 
use of PKC in WSN is just a matter of time. Moreover, 
next generation sensor nodes are expected to have 
more energies. They can have ultra-low power 
circuitry with so-called power scavengers such as 
Heliomote [33], which allows continuous energy 
supply to the nodes. At least 8-20μW of power can be 
generated using MEMS-based power scavengers [34]. 
Also some other solar-based systems have been 
developed by this time which could even be able to 
deliver power up to 100mW for MICA Motes [35].  
All these positive signs and achieved results 
indicate that: with the advancements of fast growing 
technology for sensors, PKC will no longer be 
impractical for WSNs, though still now it is expensive 
for the current generation sensor nodes. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
PKC is often ruled out considering the limitations 
of resources of sensors. The reason is that the data 
security is not the only requirement for WSNs. There 
are also many other aspects which require sharing of 
the same resources in the sensors. Hence, the main 
focus is to use cryptographic methods that can ensure 
the best level of security for sensor data with the least 
costs. Various works presented in this paper show 
good signs of the practicality of PKC. Based on our 
findings and current research trend, we can conclude 
this article with the comment that: PKC is feasible for 
the current generation sensors with a little expense of 
energy. Advancements of sensor capabilities might 
allow abundant use of PKC in WSN in near future. 
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